大地雄心：
本人自04年接触了不完全合约理论，并研究将不完全合约理论应用于公司金融的研究中，但在研究中苦于没有同道者，缺乏进行交流学习的平台，因此希望能通过经济学教育研究网认识和结交更多这方面研究的同仁，并希望得到你们的帮助。为此，我先对该理论做一个简单的陈述，提出一些相关的议题供讨论。
自Grossman & Hart (1986)和Hart & Moore（1990）早期开创性的研究以来，不完全合约理论得到了经济学家高度的关注，正如Tirole（1999）指出，该理论涉及了太多的经济主题，可广泛地研究组织和机构的规模、财务结构、控制权与决策权、与外部资本市场的联系等等。遵循实证经济学的传统，经济学家都要问任意的经济交易是否是有效率的，完全合约一般假设影响合约关系的不确定事件(或称“或有事件”，unforeseen contingencies)事前可以描述，事后也可以证实，这样合约双方可以订立状态依赖性质的合约，这种合约事前和事后都是帕雷托有效的（二阶最优second-best）。但不完全合约放松了合约方对于不确定性事件的这种认识，由此不完全合约很难保证事前和事后都有效，在一些特定的情况下，合约方可以通过设计相应的机制来事后揭示不确定性事件、非对称信息等。如果事后双方能达到信息披露的纳什均衡解，则合约是事后有效的。关键点在于通过这种动态规划的思想，事前也寄望达到有效率的配置，以促使事前对合约关系的“投资”。因此，不完全合约的建模要点是：对于外生的合约不完全性质的假定，Maskin & Tirole（1999）所提出的数字基础的合约，事后的实施（Implementation），合约规定的谈判点与惩罚点（threat point）,再谈判（renegotiation）,权力配置等等。
我提出的这些议题是：
1. 对未获信息的第三方（如法院）在合约中所扮演的角色，其效率性、公平性与社会伦理的考虑。
2. 实施理论（Implementation theory）的应用：解的概念及其解的应用范围，事后理性与事前有限理性的冲突与融合。
3. 再谈判的公理体系与实施的含义，应用于问题研究的体会和心得。
4. 关于讨价还价能力的外生性假定与内生性建模。
5. 非合作的基础与合作的架构，效用可行集合的刻画以及应用研究心得。
6. 权力配置与合约架构的内在冲突，决策程序的研究心得。
7. 其他问题。
非常欢迎你对以上问题发表高见。同时对于初次接触这个问题的同行来说，也欢迎发表意见，你的直观看法和疑问往往可以推动我们以及别的研究者更深入地思考。任何理论如果把它搞得过于神秘，也就失去了其生命力，而合约的不完全性本来就是现实的主要特征。
一些我认为较重要的参考文献：
早期开创性工作：
Grossman S, Hart O. The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of lateral and vertical integration[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94:691~719
Hart O, Moore J. Property rights and the nature of the firm[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1990, 98:1119~1158
方法论的两篇文献：
Maskin E, Tirole J. Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts[J], Review of Economic Studies, 1999, 66(1): 83~114.
Tirole J. Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?[J]. Econometrica, 1999 67(4):741~781
实施理论的两篇经典文献：
Maskin E. Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1999, 66(226): 23~38
Moore J, Repullo R. Subgame perfect implementation[J]. Econometrica, 1988, 56(5):191-220
再谈判两篇经典文献：
Maskin E, Moore J. Implementation and Renegotiation[J], Review of Economic Studies, 1999, 66: 39~56.
Segal B I, Whinston M D. The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)[J], Econometirca, 2002, 70(1):1~45
[符合XHML规范，内容为纯文本或UBB(UBB解释文件版本：2006-5-22)]
shleifer：
Hart 的书也很好啊，特别是对不完全和约理论和在司金融的运用
Hart的书 Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure 更加容易懂和更精练
哈佛大学的合约理论课大纲上有相关论文的列表，星号表示必读
6. The Incomplete Contracts Approach
6a. The Basic Framework
Acemoglu, D., P. Aghion, R. Griffith, and F. Zilibotti (2003), “Vertical Integration and Technology,” mimeo, Harvard University.
Baker, G., and T. Hubbard (2003), “Make Versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information,” American Economic Review 93: 551-72.
Baker, G., and T. Hubbard (2004), “Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in U.S. Trucking,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, November.
Bolton, P. and M. Whinston (1993), “Incomplete Contracts, Vertical Integration, and Supply Assurance,” Review of Economic Studies 60: 121-148.
deMeza, D. and B. Lockwood (1998), “Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114.
*Grossman, S. and O. Hart (1986), “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,” Journal of Political Economy, August.
*Hart, O., Ch 2-4.
Hart, O. and J. Moore (1990), “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,” Journal of Political Economy 98: 1119-1158.
Whinston, M. (2003), “On the Transaction Cost Determinants of Vertical Integration,” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 19: 1-23.
6b. Holdup and Renegotiation
Aghion, P., M. Dewatripont and P. Rey (1994), “Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information,” Econometrica 62: 257-282.
*Che, Y.-K. and D. Hausch (1999), “Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting,” American Economic Review 89: 125-147.
Chung, T.-Y. (1991), “Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk-Sharing,” Review of Economic Studies 58: 1031-1042.
Edlin, A. and S. Reichelstein (1996), “Hold-ups, Standard Breach Remedies and Optimal Investment,” American Economic Review 86: 478-501.
*Hart, O. and J. Moore (1988), “Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation,” Econometrica 56: 755-785.
MacLeod, B. and J. Malcomson (1993), “Investment, Hold-Up, and the Form of Market Contracts,” American Economic Review 83: 811-837.
Noldeke, G. and K. Schmidt (1995), “Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem,” Rand Journal of Economics 26: 163-179.
6c. Extensions and Applications of the Framework
(1) Organization Design and the Allocation of Authority within Firms
Aghion, P., M. Dewatripont and P. Rey (2003), “Transferable Control,” mimeo, Harvard University.
*Aghion, P. and J. Tirole (1997), “Real and Formal Authority in Organizations,” Journal of Political Economy 105: 1-29.
Baker, G., R. Gibbons and K. Murphy (2002), “Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117: 39-84.
Dessein, W. (2002), “Authority and Communication in Organizations,” Review of Economic Studies 69: 811-38.
Halonen, M. (2002), “Reputation and Allocation of Ownership,” Economic Journal 112: 539-58.
Rajan, R. and L. Zingales (1998), “Power in a Theory of the Firm,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 113: 387-432.
Stole, L. and J. Zwiebel (1996a), “Organizational Design and Technology Choice Under Intrafirm Bargaining,” American Economic Review 86: 195-222.
Tadelis, S. (1999), “What’s in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset,” American Economic Review 89: 548-593.
(2) Corporate Finance
*Aghion, P. and P. Bolton (1992), “An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting,” Review of Economic Studies 59: 473-494.
Berglof, E. and E.-L. von Thadden (1994), “Short-term vs. Long-term Interests: Capital Structure with Multiple Investors,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, November.
Bolton, P. and D. Scharfstein (1990), “A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting,” American Economic Review 80: 94-106.
Bolton, P. and D. Scharfstein (1996), “Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors,” Journal of Political Economy 104.
Dewatripont, M. and J. Tirole (1994), “A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager Shareholder Congruence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109: 1027-1054.
*Hart, O., Ch 5.
*Hart, O. and J. Moore (1994), “A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, November.
Hart, O. and J. Moore (1998), “Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 113: 1-41.
Kaplan, S. and P. Stromberg (2003), “Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts,” Review of Economic Studies 70: 281-315.
(3) Private vs. Public Ownership
Aghion, P., and P. Bolton (2003), “Incomplete Social Contracts,” Journal of European Economic Association.
7
*Hart, O., A. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny (1997), “The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 1127-1161.
Shleifer, A., and R.W. Vishny (1994), “Politicians and Firms,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109: 995-1025.
(4) Academia
Aghion, P., Dewatripont, M. and J. Stein (2005), “Academic Freedom, Private-Sector Focus, and the Process of Innovation,” NBER Working Paper 11542.
yiyuande：
I don't think there are many students have interest on incomplete contracts. However, in my view, your points are very interesting. And some concepts and argumements need to be treated seriously.
Specially, 1)Felli has several papers on the role of the third party, however, according to Williamson and Hart's way the third party is inable in intervene the parties. That is why Willamson appeals to private order.
2)There is no room for bounded rationality in implemention theory which persists in complete contracting theory.
3)To discuss renegotiation is a valuable road, i think, but it depends heavyly on pure game theory. It's very difficulty for students. Do you think so?
4)A good eyeshot. I will waite for your performance.
Due to the time, i'm sorry for tell the pieces of those points related to your problems. In mainland, some valuable references by Chen Zhijun(Zhejiang U.) and Nie Huihua(Renmin U.) that were published in Jingjixue Dongtai and Jingji Yanjiu respectively maybe benefit you.
yiyuande：
To add two references:
陈志俊，2000：《不完全契约理论述评》，《经济学动态》，第12期。
杨瑞龙、聂辉华，2006：《不完全契约理论：一个综述》，《经济研究》，第2期。
Besides, i think how to model the residual rights of control is an interesting problem. Recently, Aghion,Dewatripont & Rey(2004）goes forward in the direction, which is refered by Nie Huihua's paper.
It's pity that above papers neglect the advance in the foundation of incomplete contracts. Tirole's alarm of asymmetrica info isn't payed sufficient attention to by Chen and Nie's papers. Will you have any ideas?
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