注册 投稿
经济金融网 中国经济学教育科研网 中国经济学年会 EFN通讯社

CEO Compensation and Board Structure

Abstract: In response to corporate scandals in 2001 and 2002, major U.S. stock exchanges issued new board requirements to enhance board oversight. We find a significant decrease in CEO compensation for firms that were more affected by these requirements, compared with firms that were less affected, taking into account unobservable firm effects, time-varying industry effects, size, and performance. The decrease in compensation is particularly pronounced in the subset of affected firms with no outside blockholder on the board and in affected firms with low concentration of institutional investors. Our results suggest that the new board requirements affected CEO compensation decisions.

Author(s): VIDHI CHHAOCHHARIA and YANIV GRINSTEIN

CEO Compensation and Board Structure.PDF

 

文章评论
关注我们

快速入口
回到顶部
深圳网站建设