注册 投稿
经济金融网 中国经济学教育科研网 中国经济学年会 EFN通讯社

Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More

Abstract: Analyzing a panel that matches public firms with worker-level data, we find that managerial entrenchment affects workers' pay. CEOs with more control pay their workers more, but financial incentives through cash flow rights ownership mitigate such behavior. Entrenched CEOs pay more to employees closer to them in the corporate hierarchy, geographically closer to the headquarters, and associated with conflict-inclined unions. The evidence is consistent with entrenched CEOs paying more to enjoy private benefits such as lower effort wage bargaining and improved social relations with employees. Our results show that managerial ownership and corporate governance can play an important role for employee compensation.

Author(s): HENRIK CRONQVIST, FREDRIK HEYMAN, MATTIAS NILSSON, HELENA SVALERYD, and JONAS VLACHOS

Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More.PDF

文章评论
关注我们

快速入口
回到顶部
深圳网站建设