导读：2001年诺贝尔经济学奖获得者、美国增长与发展委员会主席迈克尔-斯宾塞今日为新浪财经独家撰文表示，目前身陷财政失衡与主权债务危机困境的欧元区拥有强大而自主的中央银行，但同样面临财政分散、并在政治上仅实现了部分统一的现实。
当前欧元区面临的主要挑战是能否实现纪律和灵活性的有效结合，保护集体利益，尽管这可能将导致全部财政主权的丧失，但只有这样才能符合维持欧洲货币联盟的现实需要。
以下是斯宾塞原文翻译：
已故的米尔顿-弗里德曼曾说过，一个共同货币联盟不可能在缺乏具有深刻意义的经济与政治联盟保障的情况下持续发展。弗里德曼所指的即是为货物、劳动力、资本的自由流动、开放的经济体系、有纪律的中央财政权力机构和强有力的中央银行提供保障。最后两项协同工作作为强势货币的支柱，当然其他部分也同样重要。
目前身陷财政失衡与主权债务危机困境的欧元区拥有强大而自主的中央银行，但同样面临财政分散、并在政治上仅实现了部分统一的现实。
让我们来看看《马斯特里赫特条约》，该条约对欧盟成员国政府赤字和债务水平做出了明确限制，其目的很显然是为了防止一些国家在财政政策上搭便车。
马斯特里赫特在竭力避免的就是希腊当前的局面，只可惜该条约没有发挥作用，欧元区主权债务已置身于风险之中。
在一个稳定的世界里，《马斯特里赫特条约》的规则是经济的基础框架，但如果在一个极易受冲击的世界里，它则是一个十分脆弱的系统，因为它排除了温和的反周期政策之外的任何事情。难怪在欧元的第一个10年，核心国家以及周边的盟友就常常违反该条约的严格限制。
在经历一次重大冲击后，由于税收收入缩减和社会保险支出增加。许多违约自动生成。国际货币基金组织最近的一份分析报告指出，在本次危机期间，发达国家财政刺激支出的80%是不可自由支配的。这种内置的反周期性不是坏事，但是，如果在一次巨大冲击后，触发了财政不稳定以及主权债务风险过度等威胁，那么这说明经济措施的出发点不够保守。也就是说，赤字或负债水平(或两者)过高。反周期性并不意味着政府可以在经济好的时候运行适度赤字，而在经济衰退时期运行庞大赤字。
如果目前的欧盟预算规则过于僵硬，并在应对冲击时被忽略，那么鲁莽的财政行为便无法得到控制。从理论上讲，严格深入的监测能从浪费中区别出真正的、严谨的反周期反应，而从实践角度出发却很难执行。
欧元区当前面临着若干成员国财政稳定性下降、国家主权信用评级被降低、债务成本却在上升的挑战。如果缺少外部的援助和值得信赖的计划来恢复财政秩序，希腊等国的主权债务危机就无法得以解决。上述情况在市场中产生一种默认，即希腊极有可能最终迎来债务重组。即便拥有了外部援助，但人们仍对希腊的偿还能力持怀疑态度，因为恢复财政平衡的任务是如此艰巨。
欧元区成员国可以通过排除通货膨胀和货币贬值来调整机制，或者选择国内通货紧缩加上极端的财政紧缩。但是通货紧缩是痛苦的，而且由于政治原因很难实事求是地予以推行。
对欧元区国家的限制与美国对某个财政困难的州所采取的举措十分相似。因为共同货币原因，贬值并非一种选择。美国联邦储备委员不会情愿借助通货膨胀来解决问题。
此外，在美国，有法令条例(类似马斯特里赫特)明确禁止或劝阻各州长期维持赤字状态。这意味着面对目前这种重大冲击，国家财政行为往往是亲周期性的。
那么，为什么美国的联邦制没有与欧盟同样脆弱呢？这关系到两个关键的安全阀门。其一是中央政府处理赤字并采取果断行动的能力；其二是劳动力的流动性。
欧盟并未拥有一个强大的、统一的财政结构和反经济周期的任务。并且在欧盟的长远目标里，劳动力流动受语言、法律和各种规章制度限制。
此外，国家债券没有得以平等对待，市场有意对那些挥霍的国家进行惩罚。如果欧盟希望拥有一个主权债务具有相对同等风险的货币联盟，那么其中的财政纪律也必须同等。但是，这同时也意味着当面对冲击而产生反周期性反应的时候，将需要一个更加稳健的机制。
欧盟领导人最近表示，他们打算重温马斯特里赫特结构，原则上讲这是一个好主意。他们可能采取调整马斯特里赫特规则的路线，使其在国家级别上拥有更大的跨时空的灵活性。
但这种做法会使问题变得更加复杂。谁能来担当监督和执行财政政策与主权债务的重任呢？如果其职责无法得到有效发挥，最终不过是当前情况的重演。
或许一个更好的长期解决方案是欧盟积累足够的资源增强财政能力，以应对在增长时期所受到的冲击。但是，向这个方向走也会涉及一定程度的财政集权，并且这可能会要求欧盟具备解决主权债务问题的能力。目前还不清楚这一切是否符合成员国的政治意愿。
但是，欧盟至少可以朝正确方向迈出一步，即集中部分财政并完成一定限度的反周期任务，这将能使国家一级的财政纪律得以有效执行，并提供给欧元区必要的财政纪律以使其生存下去。
欧元区最初创建之时，人们已普遍认识到财政纪律是一个关键基础。目前的经济危机则生动地强调了这一点。现在欧元区面临的挑战是能否实现纪律和灵活性的有效结合，保护集体利益，尽管这或将导致全部财政主权的丧失，但只有这样才能符合维持欧洲货币联盟的现实需要。
以下是斯宾塞著文英文原文。
The End of Fiscal Sovereignty in Europe
The late Milton Friedman said that a common currency – that is, a monetary union – cannot be sustained without a deep form of economic and political union.By this, he meant an open economy that ensures the free flow of goods, labor, and capital, together with a disciplined central fiscal authority and a strong central bank. The latter two are pillars of a strong currency. They work in tandem. But the other pieces are no less important.
The eurozone, currently wrestling with fiscal imbalance and sovereign debt risk, has a strong and autonomous central bank, but is fiscally fragmented and only partly unified politically.
Enter the Maastricht Treaty, which in theory imposes fiscal discipline by placing limits on government deficits and debt levels – clearly a structure designed to prevent free riding on the fiscal discipline of others. Maastricht was thus intended to prevent a situation like the current one in Greece.
It didn’t work. Eurozone sovereign debt turned out not to be homogenous with respect to risk.
In a stable world, Maastricht Treaty’s rules-based framework, if enforced, might do the job. But in a shock-prone world, it is a fragile system, because it precludes anything but modest countercyclical policy. No wonder, then, that the treaty’s strict limits were breached early in the euro’s first decade by core countries as well as peripheral ones.
Indeed, with a large shock, much of the breach happens automatically, as tax revenues shrink and social-insurance payments expand. Recent analysis by the International Monetary Fund suggests that as much as 80% of the fiscal stimulus in advanced countries during the current crisis is non-discretionary.
That kind of built-in counter-cyclicality is not a bad thing. But if it produces the threat of fiscal instability and excessive sovereign-debt risk after a large shock, then the starting point was not sufficiently conservative–in other words, deficits or debt levels (or both) were too high.
Counter-cyclicality does not mean running modest deficits in the good times and huge deficits in major downturns.
If the current EU budget rules are too rigid and are ignored in the face of a shock, then the door is open for imprudent fiscal behavior. In theory,strict in-depth monitoring could distinguish genuinely prudent countercyclical responses from profligacy. But in practice it is hard to enforce.
The eurozone’s immediate challenge is declining fiscal stability in a subset of countries whose credit ratings are falling and debt-service costs rising.
Absent external assistance and a credible plan for restoring fiscal order, Greek sovereign debt could not be rolled over, forcing a default, probably in the form of a restructuring of Greek debt. Even with external assistance, many view default as a near certainty, because the arithmetic of restoring fiscal balance is so daunting.
Eurozone membership precludes inflation and devaluation as adjustment mechanisms. An alternative is domestic deflation combined with extreme fiscal tightening – that is, a period of slow or negative growth in wages, incomes, and some prices of non-traded goods. But deflation is painful and cannot realistically be pursued for political reasons.
The constraints for eurozone countries are similar to those of a state in America that gets into fiscal trouble. Devaluation is not an option because of the common currency. The Federal Reserve will not willingly resort to inflation. Moreover, in the United States, there are rules and conventions (similar to Maastricht) that disallow or discourage states from running long-term deficits. This means that state fiscal behavior tends to be pro-cyclical in the face of large shocks like the recent one.
So why isn’t a federal system equally fragile? There are two key safety valves. One is the central government’s ability to run deficits and to act decisively. The other is labor mobility.
The EU does not have a robust centralized fiscal structure with a counter-cyclical mandate. And labor mobility, a long-run goal in the EU, is constrained
by language, laws, and diverse regulatory regimes.
In addition, state bonds are not treated as equals, and the markets penalize profligate states. If the EU wants a monetary union in which sovereign debt is relatively homogenous with respect to risk, fiscal discipline must be similarly homogenous. But that also means that it will need a more robust mechanism for countercyclical responses to shocks.
The EU’s leaders recently stated their intention to revisit the Maastricht structure, which in principle is a good idea. They might take the route of adapting the Maastricht rules to allow for more inter-temporal flexibility at the national level. But that approach would be complicated. One would need a sophisticated capability for monitoring and enforcing fiscal policy and sovereign debt – or else end up with a repeat of the current situation.
A better long-term solution is a central EU fiscal capacity that accumulates the resources to respond to shocks during periods of growth. One could think of it as a stabilization tax that becomes negative in downturns.
But a move in this direction does involve some degree of fiscal centralization. And it probably would require that the EU be able to issue sovereign debt.
It is unclear whether there is the political will to do all that.
But a step in the right direction could be taken by partial fiscal centralization with a limited countercyclical mandate. That would enable effective enforcement of fiscal discipline at the national level and provide the euro with the fiscal discipline it needs to survive.
When the eurozone was created, it was widely understood that fiscal discipline was a crucial underpinning. The current crisis vividly underscores the point.
The challenge now is to achieve a combination of discipline and flexibility that protects the collective interest. That will involve a loss of full fiscal sovereignty, but facing up to that reality is required to sustain the monetary union。
