Journal of Public Economics 2012 Oct.目录

Highlights

► Do people care about social rankings that bring no tangible benefits? ► Indeed, this field experiment found an inherent preference for high rank. ► Students told their rank during a course scored better on international final test. ► Result held when ranks were told privately, thus bringing no tangible benefits. ► Making rankings public further increased performance, but was insignificant.

Highlights

► Concerns for social status can be ordinal or cardinal. ► Social status affects the relationship between inequality and conspicuous consumption. ► When status is ordinal, more equality increases conspicuous consumption. ► Cardinal status allows for more equality to reduce conspicuous consumption. ► Cardinal status allows for more equality to be Pareto improving.

Highlights

► We study the private provision of excludable public goods. ► We identify an incentive to wait in order to negotiate access later. ► We demonstrate how such free-riding depends on the model’s parameters. ► We demonstrate that the argument is quite robust to alternative assumptions.

Highlights

► Analyzes financial status and environmental enforcement effectiveness. ► Considers enforcement likelihood and severity and liquidity, solvency, profitability. ► Identifies theoretically optimal abatement in the presence of liquidity and bankruptcy. ► Examines empirically enforcement of wastewater limits. ► Shows theoretically and empirically more enforcement can increase pollution.

Highlights

► We look at mixed strategy equilibrium in participation of a canonical IEA game. ► It reinforces a pessimistic result on participation in the literature. ► For sufficiently low abatement costs, the use of mixed strategies overturns that conclusion. ► With pure strategies, investment reducing abatement costs may be counterproductive. ► In contrast, with mixed strategies, investment leads to higher participation and welfare.

Highlights

► We analyze the location pattern of foreign firms in 11,200 German municipalities. ► We find much higher tax elasticities than those estimated from aggregate data. ► Attracting one foreign firm would be unaffordable for the average municipality. ► Business tax competition is the game of a few micro-regional units.