题 目: Optimal Yardstick Rules Under Infinitely Repeated Competition
演讲人: Brett Graham, WISE, Xiamen University
主持人：隋勇 博士
时间: 2010年5月19日 (周三), 3:30-5:00pm
地点: 上海交大北楼107
Abstract
This paper derives optimal yardstick rules for two homogeneous firms in the presence of tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated environment under different equilibrium punishment schemes. In particular, we show how the optimal yardstick rule when firms use Nash reversion differs from when firms use the maximal punishment associated with a strongly symmetric equilibria (SSE). Two measures of optimality are considered. The first maximizes the threshold discount factor required for joint monopoly profits to be sustainable as a sub-game perfect equilibrium. The second minimizes the most collusive outcome for an arbitrary discount factor.
We show that under the first measure of optimality, when firms use Nash reversion, the ”cost of service” yardstick scheme is optimal. When firms use a strongly symmetric equilibrium the optimal yardstick scheme depends on the firms’ monopoly rents. When monopoly rents are high, the ”cost of service” yardstick scheme continues to be optimal. When monopoly rents are low, the fully discriminatory yardstick scheme is optimal. Under the second measure of optimality, the optimal yardstick scheme is discount factor dependent both when firms use Nash reversion and SSE.
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