【本期主题】Transfer of Authority within Hierarchy
Bureaucracy is featured by vertical hierarchical structure In which the decision maker usually lacks direct access to the informed agent, and the span of discretionary authority decreases top down.In this paper we investigate the delegation scheme in three-level hierarchies.The minister delegates authority to a biased senior bureaucrat, then the senior makes further delegation decision to the junior. We provide a full characterization of the implemented interval delegation set. It's shown that the efficiency is attained if and only if the senior's bias lies between the minister and the junior. We reverse the conclusion in Dessein (2002) that delegation ex ante dominates informative cheap talk and shows that, for some range of senior's preferences, the minister would prefer keeping control and using the senior as information gate-keeper to delegating. The hiring policy, job contents and promotion decision in bureaucracy are interrelated. Given the bias of the senior, the optimal junior should be intermediately between the senior and the minister.Under certain conditions the loyal bureaucrat would be put into action-level and doesn't get promotion. Complete delegation to the senior may arise endogenously by the minister's ignorance about the personal objects of the junior.
【报告人】梁平汉 西南财经大学经济与管理研究院 副教授、巴塞罗那经济学研究生院经济学博士
【时 间】11月17日中午12:00
【地 点】中国人民大学明德主楼714
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报告人简介：
梁平汉，西南财经大学经济与管理研究院副教授， 西班牙巴塞罗那经济学研究生院经济学博士，曾在巴萨罗纳的IDEA项目做过TA。主要教学与研究领域：博弈论、应用微观理论、组织经济学、产业经济学、新政治经济学、行为经济学。中文著作:《成功可以追随吗？构造和检验中国股市个体投资者策略》，《中国金融学》第4卷第1期，《巴蜀商道》（专著，第二作者），巴蜀书社，《话说川商》（专著，第二作者），中华工商联合出版社，《感谢高考》，中国青年出版社。入选2009年“国家优秀自费留学生奖学金”。
transfer_of_authority_within_hierarchy.pdf
财政金融学院
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二零一零年十一月十五日
