【本期主题】 ON THE ANTICIPATION OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN ANALYST RESEARCH
This paper examines the economic consequences on firms covered by analysts subject to conflicts of interest. Using the 2002 Global Settlement (GS), which prohibits analysts from being compensated for generating investment banking business, it develops a novel approach to identify analysts whose research suffers from conflicts of interest (conflicted analysts) and firms whose coverage is tainted by such conflicts. First, it documents that a shift in analyst compensation structure leads to a shift in analyst coverage: Post GS, analysts rely less on a firm’s investment banking business potential but more on its trading revenue potential in their coverage decision. Next, it provides evidence that the capital market recognizes and adjusts to these conflicts of interest: (1) Conflicted analysts generate stronger market reactions when they downgrade companies under their coverage, an event which tends to be costly for investment firms they are affiliated with. (2) Subsequent to losing coverage by conflicted analysts, firms face a smaller rise in information asymmetry in the capital market, and experience a smaller setback in capital investment and equity issuance. Its findings indicate that regulatory efforts aiming at investor protection may not warrant the intended goal, as investors already place little value on research motivated by analysts’ private incentives.
【报告人】于晓筠 印地安那大学凯莱商学院副教授
【时 间】5月16日（星期一）中午12:00
【地 点】中国人民大学明德主楼714
【联系人】李红梅 62514479 诚邀您参加。如果您有兴趣，请于5月16日前发送邮件hanqing.seminar@gmail.com或电话联系。
【报告人简介】于晓筠教授现任美国印第安纳大学凯莱商学院金融系副教授（终身教职），曾任美国印第安纳大学凯莱商学院金融系助理教授，美国明尼苏达大学金融系客座助理教授、瑞典金融研究学院访问学者等职务。于晓筠教授讲授的课程主要包括《公司财务》，《公司财务的分析与决策》，《公司中级理财学》等。于晓筠教授在国际著名学术刊物如Journal of Finance， Journal of Business，Review of Financial Studies，Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Journal of Corporate Finance，等发表多篇论文。并参与编写了《中国的社会保障制度改革》一书。
汉青经济与金融高级研究院
二零一一年五月十二日
