题 目：Sales Executives, Reporting Quality and Optimal Compensation 报告人：Prof. Kai Wai HUI, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
主持人：上海交通大学会计系 郝盛泉博士
时间：2011年11月23日（周三）上午10: 00-11: 30
地点：上海交通大学安泰104
内容提要：
We investigate the role played by sales executives, if any, in revenue recognition. We find that firms paying high bonuses to sales executives have lower quality sales reporting than firms paying small bonuses. This effect is directly attributable to sales executives but is present only when the benefits of manipulation are sufficiently high or when the costs are sufficiently low. The results also suggest that both internal and external users of financial statements are aware of these phenomena and adjust, at least partially, their investment decisions accordingly. Our results are consistent with the notion that principals allow some reporting manipulation to reach efficient contracts. Consistent with this view, firms paying higher bonuses to their sales executives have been affected more negatively by enactment of the SOX. Overall, while prior literature focuses on the role of CEOs and CFOs, we find evidence that non financial executives also significantly influence reporting quality.
报告人简介：
Kai Wai HUI is a tenured Associate Professor in accounting at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST) and a PhD from the University of Oregon. His research focuses on the disclosure of accounting information and its influences on investing and contracting decisions. He has published in journals such as the Accounting Review, the Journal of Accounting and Economics, and the Journal of Financial Economics.
