Outperforming CEOs in Financial Crisis: Are They Smart or just Lucky? Evidence from Deferred Compensation
主讲嘉宾：岑维（Cen wei, 北京大学汇丰商学院助教授）
时间：2012年11月23日（周五），下午16:00-17:30
地点：岭南堂第四会议室
Abstract: Using a unique dataset from executive deferred compensation and the 2008 financial crisis, an exogenous event, we develop a novel approach to determine a CEO’s risk aversion, and examine the relationship between CEO risk preferences and firm risk, gauged by volatility in stock returns, earnings and operating cash flows. The results reveal a negative association between CEO risk aversion and stock price volatility. We also find that firms with CEO deferred compensation plans have lower performance volatility. The results contribute to the inside debt literature by showing that inside debt compensation is related to lower firm risk and firm market value.
岑维主页： http://www.phbs.pku.edu.cn/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=459&id=2
