题目：Subjective Performance Feedback, Employee Turnover and Renegotiation-Proof Contracts
报告人：陈 斌 中山大学管理学院
主持人：叶 兵
时 间：2012年12月7日 星期五 15:00-17:00
地 点：浙大玉泉校区外经贸大楼418室
内容概要：This paper investigates the optimal design of midterm reviews in a setting where the employee's ability is unknown to all the parties ex ante, and his turnover is allowed subsequent to midterm reviews. We consider a project that contains two stages of independent tasks, and that the manager need to hire one employee to undertake each task. At the end of the first stage, the manager can choose to evaluate the interim performance, or the employee's ability, or both, and use the resulting information to determine whether to retain the same employee or hire a new one in the second stage, as well as the compensation packages. We show that the presence of an ability appraisal will undermine the credibility of transmitting feedback in the subjective evaluation of interim performance. If an ability appraisal has been chosen and provides sufficient information for an effecient employee turnover, the manager cannot honestly implement any renegotiation-proof contract in which the payments vary with the subjective IPE signal. Therefore, the optimal design of midterm reviews corresponds to evaluating either the interim performance or the employee's ability, but not evaluating both. We also extend the model by considering the situation in which effort across stages shares complementarity or substitutability, and generalize our findings.
