9月13日刘挺军讲座,题目Targeting target shareholders
发布时间:2012-9-10 发布人:yjj 点击数:384
报告人:Tingjun Liu (刘挺军,长江商学院)
题目: Targeting target shareholders
时间:9月13日(周四)15:30-17:00
地点:对外经济贸易大学博学楼1120会议室
论文摘要:
We integrate heterogeneity and uncertainty in investor valuations into a model of takeovers. Investors have dispersed valuations, holding shares in firms they value more highly, and a successful offer must win approval from the median target shareholder. We derive the consequences for an acquiring firm's takeover offer—-its size and cash/equity structure—-and implications for takeover premia and firm returns. Cash offers are optimal when the acquirer's private valuation is high relative to target shareholders; while equity offers are optimal when the reverse holds. The acquirer's share price always rises following cash acquisitions. The combined target-acquirer return is always higher after a cash acquisition than an equity acquisition (which can be negative). We characterize how synergies and the extent of uncertainty about target shareholder valuations affect the optimal offer and probability a takeover succeeds.