Journal of Public Economics 2012 Aug.目录

Highlights

► Evaluates Swiss field experiment on vouchers for adult education. ► No significant average effects on earnings, employment, and subsequent education. ► Low-education individuals most likely to profit, but least likely to use voucher. ► Public voucher program appears to crowd out firm-financed training. ► Findings cast doubt on the effectiveness of untargeted voucher programs.

Highlights

► I study the responses of municipalities to taxes in their neighbor municipalities. ► I use a policy intervention as a source of exogenous variation in property tax rates. ► I find no evidence of property tax competition between Finnish municipalities. ► Standard spatial econometrics methods give biased results.

Highlights

► An experiment designed to focus on crowd-out as strategic response to a tax. ► Contributions are greater than the dominant strategy; a tax increases contributions. ► We find evidence of three different player types. ► Some players contribute the dominant strategy; others the Pareto efficient quantity. ► A third type is well organized by a model of warm-glow with logit decision error.

Highlights

► School choice programs may affect residential sorting and house values. ► We test whether states' inter-district choice programs affect sorting and house values. ► House values rise if there are desirable out-of-district options nearby. ► Population density and mean household income also rise. ► Residential homogeneity increases when excludable public goods become less exclusive.

Highlights

► We offer a quantitative evaluation of a plausible Social Security reform. ► Simulation of the reform shows that careers lengthen and welfare gains are large. ► Estimation draws new inference from the change in expenditure at retirement.

Highlights

► Validates the standard trust question routinely used in social capital research. ► Uses a public good experiment with a large and heterogeneous sample. ► Disentangles preferences for cooperation from beliefs about others' cooperation. ► The standard trust question is a proxy for cooperation preferences.