Topic: Self-confidence and Strategic Behavior
Speaker：Gary Charness
Gary Charness is professor at University of California, Santa Barbara. His works cover experimental game theory, experimental labor economics, social preferences and he has punished numerous papers on top journals like American Economic Review, Econometrica, Games and Economic Behavior, etc. Below is a list of his current editorial jobs:
Associate Editor, Journal of the European Economic Association, November, 2011-
Advisory Editor, Games and Economic Behavior, June, 2011 -
Associate Editor, Management Science, October, 2009 -
Editorial Board, Experimental Economics, December, 2006 -
Editorial Board, American Economic Review, January, 2006 -
Editorial Board, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, May, 2005 -
Guest Editor, Journal of Marketing Research, August, 2010
Ad-Hoc Editor, American Economic Journals – Micro, February, 2011 -
Affiliation：University of California, Santa Barbara
Time：1:00-2:30pm, Friday, Dec. 21
Location：Room 217, Guanghua New Building, Peking University
Download: CV-Gary Paper
Abstract: We test experimentally an explanation of over and under con?dence as motivated by (perhaps unconscious) strategic concerns, and ?nd compelling evidence supporting this hypothesis in how participants send and respond to incentivized statements of con?dence. In two-player tournaments where the highest score wins, one is very likely to enter when one knows his or her stated con?dence is higher than the other player’s, but very unlikely when the reverse is true. Consistent with this behavior, stated con?dence by males is in?ated when deterrence is strategically optimal and is instead de?ated by males and females when hustling (encouraging entry) is strategically optimal; this behavior is consistent with the equilibrium of the signaling game. Based on the theory of salient perturbations, we suggest that there is a strategic foundation of overcon?dence. Since overcon?dent statements are used in familiar situations in which it is strategically e?ective, it may also occur in the absence of strategic bene?ts, provided the environment is similar.
Speaker’s website: http://econ.ucsb.edu/~charness/
