题 目：非正式权威、正式权威与中国农村的公共品提供
Informal Authority, Formal Authority, and Public Goods Provision in Rural China
主讲人：徐轶青 (北京大学国家发展研究院)
时 间：2010年1月4日（星期一）下午3.00-5.00
地 点：北京师范大学主楼B区507
Abstract: Based on a unique dataset collected from 246 villages of 29 Chinese provinces during 1986-2005, we investigate the role of authority coupling in public goods provision and the relationship between kinship networks and grassroots democracy. Our empirical strategy asks whether an elected village chairperson (VC), who comes from the largest surname group, will increase the chance of village self-funded public investments in his/her term of office. Both static fixed-effect models and a dynamic panel framework are appealed to, followed by a quasi-experiment approach to address potential endogeneity. We find that on average, 0.264 more projects will be carried out in a normal three-year term if the VC in office comes from the village’s largest family than otherwise – a difference as much as 46.8% of the sample mean. This is probably because VCs from the largest surnames can minimize collective action problem and alleviate redistribution pressure from the public. This effect is more salient in the villages that maintain genealogies or ancestral halls and only exists after elections had been adopted. Our results suggest that in Chinese villages, if traditional authorities (large families) identify with elected formal authorities, democracy can work better. The result also implies that transplanted institutions do not necessarily conflict with persistent, indigenous institutions; on the contrary, they may reinforce each other if the former could properly release the potential power embedded in the latter.
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北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院
收入分配与贫困研究中心
2009/12/30
