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【4月8日】北京:Career Patterns and Career Concerns

题目:Career Patterns and Career Concerns
报告人:Johannes Horner, Yale University
时间:2:00-3:30pm, April 8
地点:北京大学光华新楼216教室

Abstract:
This paper examines reputational incentives in the context of traditional promotion systems. As in Holmstr¨om (1999), a worker’s productive abilities are revealed over time through output, and wages are based on expected output, and so on assessed ability. Specifically, work increases the probability that a skilled worker achieves an observable breakthrough. In the presence of a deadline, it is shown that career concerns not only affect the amount of work produced, but also its timing: while it would be best to have the worker put in effort early, it is optimal for him to do so midway through his probationary period if this effort is not observed, and late if it is observed. Committing to a deadline is shown to be welfare-increasing, even if it curtails learning. In the observable case, it is better to condition termination on time than on assessed ability.
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