1. Tirole = J. Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988.
2. HIO = R. Schmalensee and R. Willig, eds. Handbook of Industrial Organization, New York: North Holland, 1989.
3. Laffont & Tirole = J. -J. Laffont & J. Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Regulation and Procurement, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993.
4. Armstrong et al. = M. Armstrong, S. Crown, and J. Vickers, Regulatory Reform--Economic Analysis and British Experience, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994.
I. The Theory of the Firm
A. Theory
1. Tirole, Introduction and The Theory of the Firm.
2. Chandler, ''Organizational Capabilities and the Economic History of the Industrial Enterprise,'' Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6 (Summer 1992), 79-100.
3. R. Coase, ''The Nature of the Firm,'' reprinted in G. Stigler and K. Boulding, eds., Readings in Price Theory, Irwin, 1952, 33 l-351.
4. S. Grossman and O. Hart, ''The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, 94 (August 1986), 691 -796.
5. B. Holmstrom and J. Tirole, ''The Theory of the Firm," in HIO.
6. B. Klein, R. Crawford, and A. Alchian, ''Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process,'' Journal of Law and Economics, 21 (October l978), 297-326.
7. O. Williamson, The Economic institutions of Capitalism, Free Press, 1985, Chapters 3-6 (especially 1 and 3).
B. Empirical Evidence on Asset Specificity
1. E. Anderson and D. Schmittlein, ''Integration of the Sales Force: An Empirical Examination," Rand Journal of Economics, 15(Autumn 1984), 327-343.
2. P. Joskow, ''Vertical Integration and Long Term Contracts: The Case of Coal-Burning Electric-Generating Plants," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, I (Spring 1985), 33-80.
3. P. Joskow, ''Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets," American Economic Review, 77 (March 1987), 168-l85.
4. P. Joskow, ''Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence," Chapter 8 in O. Williamson and S. Winter, The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development, Oxford 1993, 117-137.
5. K. Monteverde and D. Teece, ''Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry,'' Bell Journal of Economics, 13 (Spring 1982), 206-213.
6. A. Shepard, "Contractual Form, Retail Pricing and Asset Characteristics in Gasoline Retailing," Rand Journal of Economics, 24(Spring 1993), 58-77.
II. Monopoly Pricing
A. Basic Monopoly Pricing and Durable Goods
1. Tirole, Chapter 1 (including supplementary section).
2. M. Pesendorfer, ``Retail Sales. A Study of Pricing Behavior in Supermarkets,'' mimeo.
B. First and Third Degree Price Discrimination
1. Tirole, Sections 3.0 - 3.2
2. Katz, M., "The Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Intermediate Goods Markets," American Economic Review, 77, (March 1 987), pp. 154-67.
3. Schmalensee, R., ''Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree Price-Discrimination,'' American Economic Review, 71 (March 1981), pp. 242-47.
4. Varian, H., ''Price Discrimination and Social Welfare,'' American Economic Review, 75 (September 1985), pp. 870-5.
5. Perry, Martin, ''Forward Integration by ALCOA: 1888-1930," Journal of Industrial Economics, 29 (l), September 1980, pp. 37-53.
C. Second Degree Price Discrimination
1. Tirole, Sections 3.3 - 3.5.
2. Maskin, E. And J. Riley, "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," Rand Journal of Economics 15 (Summer 1984), pp. 171-96,
3. Oi, W., ''A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part Tariffs for a Mickey-Mouse Monopoly,'' Quarterly Journal of Economics, 85 (February 197l), pp. 77-96.
4. McAfee, P., J. McMillan, and M. Whinston, ''Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values,'' Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104 (May 1989), pp. 37l-83.
5. Blackstone, E., ''Restrictive Practices in the Marketing of Electrofax Copying Machines. The SCM Corporation Case,'' Journal of Industrial Economics, 23 (March 1975), pp. 189-202.
6. Shepard, A., ''Price Discrimination and Retail Configuration,'' Journal of Political Economy, 99 (February 1991), pp. 30-53.
7. I. Ayers, and P. Siegelman, "Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car,'' American Economic Review, 85 (June 1995), 304-321.
8. Borenstein, S. and N. Rose, "Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry," Journal of Political Economy, 102 (August 1994), 653-683.
III . Estimating Demand (and Supply)
1. Deaton and J. Muellbauer, Economics and Consumer Behavior, Parts 1 and 2.
2. S. Anderson, A. De Palma and J. Thisse, Discrete Choice Theory of Product Differentiation, Chapters 2-5.
3. D. Epple, "Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Estimating Demand and Supply Functions for Differentiated Products, Journal of Political Economy, 95 (February 1987), 59-80.
4. Berry, S., J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes, ''Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium," Econometrica, Vol. 63, No. 4, July 1995, pp. 841-890.
5. A. Petrin, "Quantifying the Benefits of New Products: The Case of the Minivan'', mimeo.
6. Goldberg, P.K., ''tas,'' Econometrica, Vol. 63, No. 4, July 1995, pp. 891-952.
7. S. Ellison, I. Cockburn, Z. Griliches and J. Hansman, "Characteristics of Demand for Pharmaceutical Products: An Examination of Four Cephalosporins,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 28, Autumn 1997, 426-446.
8. J. Hausman, "Valuation of New Goods under Perfect and Imperfect Competition,'' in The Economics of New Goods, T. Bresnahan and R. Gordon (eds.) and comment by T. Bresnahan.
9. J. Hansman, "Reply to Prof. Bresnahan," mimeo.
10. T. Bresnahan, "The Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios War: Valuing New Goods, Identifying Market Power, and Economic Measurement," mimeo.
IV . Introduction to Strategic Behavior and Static Competition
A. Introduction to Strategic Behavior
1. D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, ''Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview,'' in HIO.
2. Tirole, pp. 205-208 and Chapter 11.
B. Prices and Output
1. C. Shapiro, ''Theories of Oligopoly Behavior," in HIO.
2. Tirole, Chapters 2.1 and 5.
3. D. Kreps and J. Scheinkman, ''Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournt Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (Autumn 1983), 326-337.
4. Klemperer, P., "The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs," Rand Journal of Economics, 18 (Spring 1987), pp. 138-50.
5. Sutton, J., and A. Shaked, ''Relaxing Price Competition through Product Differentiation,'' Review of Economic Studies, 49 (January 1982), pp. 3- 14.
6. D. Stalil, "Oligopolistic Pricing with Heterogeneous Consumer Search,'' International Journal of Industrial Organization, 14 (April 1996), 243-268.
V. Dynamic Competition
A. Theory
1. Tirole, Chapter 6.
2. Rotemberg, J. J. and G. Saloner, "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms,'' American Economic Review, 76 (June 1986), 390-407.
3. K. Bagwell and R. W. Staiger, "Collusion over the Business Cycle,'' Rand Journal of Economics, (Spring 1997), 82-106.
4. Brock, W. and J. Scheinkman, "Price-Setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints,'' Review of Economic Studies, 52 (1985), pp. 37 l-82.
5. Green, E. and R. Porter, ''Non-cooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information,'' Econometrica, 52 (January 1984), pp. 87-100.
6. Maskin, E. and J. Tirole, "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles," Econometrica, 56 (May 1988), pp.571 -99.
7. Bernheim and M. Whinston, "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," Rand Journal of Economics, 21 (Spring 1990), l-26.
8. Stigler, G.J., "A Theory of Oligopoly," Journal of Political Economy, 72 (February l964), pp. 44-61.
B. Empirical Evidence
1. R. Porter, ''A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Economic Committee, 1880-l886," Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (Autumn 1983), 301-314.
2. G. Ellison, ''Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 25 (Spring 1994), 37-57.
3. D. Genesove and W. Mullin, "Narrative Evidence on the Dynamics of Collusion: The Sugar Institute Case, " mimeo.
4. R. Grether and C. Plott, ''The Effects of Market Practices in Oligopolistic Markets: An Experimental Examination of the Ethyl Case,'' Economic inquiry, 22 (October l984), 479-507.
5. M. Levenstein, "Price Wars and the Stability of Collusion: A Study of the PreWorld War I Bromine industry,'' The Journal of Industrial Economics, June 1997, 117-138.
6. S. Borenstein and A. Shepard, ''Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets,'' The Rand Journal of Economics, Autumn 1996, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 429-451.
VI. Empirical Studies of Firm Conduct
A. Inter-Industry Studies
1. F. M. Scherer and D. Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, Chapter 11.
2. R. Schmalensee, ''Interindustry Studies of Structure and Performance,'' in HIO.
3. Demsetz, H., "Industry Structure, Market Rivalry and Public Policy,'' Journal of Law and Economics, 16, (1973), l-10.
4. I. Domowitz, R. Hubbard and B. Petersen, "Business Cycles and the Relationship Between Concentration and Price-Cost Margins," Rand Journal of Economics, 17(Spring 1986), 1-17.
5. R. Schmalensee, ''Do Markets Differ Much?" American Economic Review, 75 (June 1985), 341-351.
6. M. Salinger, "The Concentration-Margin Relationship Reconsidered,'' Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 1990, 287-335.
B. Theory of Conduct Parameters
1. T. Bresnahan, "The Oligopoly Solution Concept is Identified," Economics Letters, 10, 1982, 87-92.
2. L. Lau, "On Identifying the Degree of Competitiveness from Industry Price and Output Data,'' Economics Letters, 10, 1982, 93-99.
3. J. Panzar and J. Rosse, "Testing for 'Monopoly' Equilibrium," Journal of Industrial Economics, 35 (June 1987), 443-456.
4. K. Corts, "Conduct Parameters and the Measurement of Market Power,'' Journal of Econometrics ???
C. Industry-Specific Studies of Firm Conduct
1. T. Bresnahan, "Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power,'' in HIO.
2. R. Coterill, "Market Power in the Retail Food Industry: Evidence from Vermont," Review of Economics and Statistics, 68 (August 1986), 379-386.
3. A. Nevo, "Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry,'' mimeo.
4. T. Bresnahan, "Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Industry: The 1955 Price War,'' Journal of Industrial Economics, 35 (June 1987), 457-482.
5. D. Genesove and W. Mullin, "Testing Oligopoly Models: Conduct and Cost in the Sugar Industry, 1898-1914,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 29 (Summer 1 998), 355-377.
6. C. Wolfram, "Measuring Duopoly Power in the British Electricity Spot Market,'' mimeo.
7. Baker, J. and T. Bresnahan, ''Empirical Methods of Identifying and Measuring Market Power," Antitrust Law Journal, Vol.61, 1992,pp.3-16.
VII . Entry
A. Basic Theory
1. Tirole, Sections 7.l-7.2
2. Mankiw, N.G. and M.D. Whinston, "Free Entry and Social Inefficiency,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 17 (Spring 1986), pp. 48-58.
3. Anderson, S., A. de Palma, and Y. Nesterov, "Oligopolistic Competition and the Optimal Provision of Products," Econometrica, Vol. 63, No. 6, November 1995, pp.l281-1302.
4. Sutton, J., Sunk Costs and Market Structure, MIT Press, 1991, Chapters l-2.
5. B. Jovanovic, ''Selection and the Evolution of Industry," Econometrica, (May 1982), 649-670.
6. Banmol, W.K., J.C. Panzar, and R.D. Willig, ''On the Theory of Perfectly Contestable Markets," in J.E. Stiglitz and G.F. Mathewson, eds., New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure, MIT Press, 1986.
B . Empirical Evidence
1. T. Bresnahan and P. Reiss, ''Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets,'' Journal of Political Economy, 99 (October 1991), 977- 009.
2. Comments on Bresnahan and Reiss, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Special Issue on Microeconomics, 3 (1987), 872-882.
3. T. Dunne, M. Roberts, and L. Samuelson, ''Patterns of Firm Entry and Exit in U.S. Manufacturing,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 19 (Winter 1988), 495-515.
4. Berry, S. and J. Waldfogel, ''Free Entry and Social Inefficiency in Radio Broadcasting," June 1996.
5. S. Berry, ''Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline industry, " Econometrica, 60 (July 1992), 889-918.
VIII . Strategic Investment
A. General Considerations
1. Tirole, pp. 207-8, Chapter 8.
2. J. Bulow, J. Geanakoplos and P. Klemperer, '`Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, 93 (June 1985), 488-511.
3. D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, "The Fat Cat Effect, the Puppy Dog Ploy and the Lean and Hungry Look,'' American Economic Review, 74 (May 1 984), 36 1 -366.
4. R. Gilbert, ''Mobility Barriers and the Value of Incumbency," in HIO.
B. Capacity, Product Differentiation, beaming Curves, Contracts
1. A. Dixit, ''The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence,'' Economic Journal, 90 (March l980), 95-106.
2. R. Schmalensee, ''Economies of Scale and Barriers to Entry,'' Journal of Political Economy, 89 (December 1981), pp. 1228-38.
3. J.R. Gelman and S.C. Salop, ''Judo Economics. Capacity Limitation and Coupon Competition,'' Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (Autumn 1983), pp. 315-25.
4. D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, "Capital as a Commitment: Strategic Investment to Deter Mobility,'' Journal of Economic Theory, 31 (December 1983), 227-250.
5. R. Schmalensee, ''Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry,'' Bell Journal of Economics, 9 (Autumn 1978), pp. 305-27.
6. K. Judd, ''Credible Spatial Preemption," Rand Journal of Economics, 16 (Summer 1985), pp. 153-66.
7. D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, "Learning by Doing and Market Performance,'' Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (Autumn 1983), pp. 522-30.
8. P. Aghion and P. Bolton, "Entry Prevention Through Contracts with Customers,'' American Economic Review, 77, June 1987, pp. 388-401.
9. T.E. Cooper, "Most-Favored Customer Pricing and Tacit Collusion,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 17 (Autumn 1986), pp. 377-88.
10. J. J. Laffont, P. Rey and J. Tirole, "Network Competition I : Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 29 (Spring 1 998), l -37.
C. Empirical Evidence on Strategic Investment
1. J. Chevalier, "Capital Structure and Product Market Competition: Empirical Evidence from the Supermarket Industry,'' American Economic Review, June 1995.
2. M. Lieberman, "Post Entry investment and Market Structure in the Chemical Processing Industry," Rand Journal of Economics, 18 (Winter 1987), 533-549.
3. G. Hurdle, et al., "Concentration, Potential Entry, and Performance in the Airline Industry,'' Journal of Industrial Economics, 38 (December 1989), 119-140.
4. R. Smiley, "Empirical Evidence on Strategic Entry Deterrence,'' International Journal of Industrial Organization, 6 (June 1988), 167- 180.
IX. Information and Strategic Behavior
A. Limit Pricing
1. Tirole, Sections 9.0 - 9.4.
2. P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, ''Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis,'' Econometrica, 50 (March 1982), 443-460.
B. Predation
1. Tirole, Sections 9.5 - 9.7.
2. P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, ''Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, 27 (August 1982), pp. 288-312.
3. G. Saloner, ''Predation, Merger, and Incomplete information," Rand Journal of Economics, 18 (Summer 1987), pp. 165-186.
4. D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, ''A 'Signal-Jamming' Theory of Predation,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 17 (Autumn 1986), pp. 366-76.
5. P. Bolton and D. Scharfstein, ''A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting,'' American Economic Review, 80 (March 1 990), pp. 93- 106.
6. Benoit, J.P., ''Financially Constrained Entry in a Game of Incomplete Information," Rand Journal of Economics, 15, pp. 490-99.
7. J. Oulover and G. Saloner, ''Predation, Monopolization and Antitrust," in HIO.
C. Empirical Studies of Information Asymmetries and Predation
1. D. Cooper, S. Garvin and J. Kagel, "Signaling and Adaptive Learning in an Entry Limit Pricing Game,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 28 (Winter 1997), 662-683.
2. D. Genesove, "Adverse Selection in the Wholesale Used Car Market,'' Journal of Political Economy, 101 (August 1993), 644-665.
3. M. Doyle and C. Snyder, "Information Sharing and Competition in the Motor Vehicle Industry," mimeo.
4. T. Hubbard, "Consumer Beliefs and Buyer and Seller Behavior in the Vehicle Inspection Market,'' mimeo.
5. J. McGee,'' Predatory Price Cutting The Standard Oil (NJ) Case,'' Journal of Law and Economics, l (October 1958), 137-169.
6. D. Genesove and W. Mullin, "Predation and Its Rate of Return: The Sugar industry, l887- 1914," NBER Working Paper 6032, 1997.
7. D. Weiman and R. Levin, ''Preying for Monopoly: Southern Bell," Journal of Political Economy, 102 (February 1994), 103-26.
8. Kadiyali, V., ''Entry, Its Deferrence, and its Accommodation: A Study of the U.S. Photographic Film Industry," The Rand Journal of Economics, Autumn 1 996, Vol. 27,
X. Advertising
1. Tirole, Sections 2.2-2.4, 7.3
2. M. Stegeman, ''Advertising in Competitive Markets,'' American Economic Review, 81 (March 1991), 210-223.
3. F. M. Scherer and D. Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, Chapter 18.
4. Kwoka, J. ''Advertising the Price and Quality of Optometric Services,'' American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 1984, 211 -216.
5. P. Ippolito and A. Mathios, ''Information, Advertising and Health: A Study of the Cereal Market,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 21 (Autumn 1 990), 459-480.
6. D. Ackerberg, "Advertising, Learning, and Consumer Choice in Experience Good Markets: An Empirical Examination,'' mimeo.
XI. Auctions
1. P. McAfee and J. McMillan, ''Auctions and Bidding," JEL, June 1987, pp. 699-738.
2. P. Milgrom, "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," JEP, Summer 1989, pp. 3-22.
3. K. Hendricks and R. Porter, ''An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information,'' American Economic Review, December 1 988, pp. 865-83.
4. R. Porter, ''The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions," Econometrica, 63 (January 1995), pp. 1-27.
5. R. Porter and D. Zona, "Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions," JPE, June 1993, pp. 5 18-38.
6. P. Bajari, "Econometrics of the First Price Auction with Asymmetric Bidders," mimeo.
7. J.-J. Laffont, H. Ossard, and Q. Vuong, ''Econometrics of First Price Auctions,'' EM, July 1995, pp. 953-80.
8. J. Kagel, R. Harstad and D. Levin, ''Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study, "Econometrica, 55 (1987), pp. 1275- 1304.
9. J. Kagel, ''Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research,'' in J. Kagel and A. Roth, eds., The Handbook of Experimental Economics.
XII . Technological Change
A. Research and Development
1. Tirole, Sections 10.l - 10.5, 8. l.3
2. G. C. Loury, ''Market Structure and Innovation,'' Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93 (1979), pp. 395-410.
3. D. Fudenberg, R. Gilbert, J. Stiglitz, and J. Tirole, "Preemption, Leapfrogging, and Competition in Patent Races," European Economic Review, 22 (1983), pp. 3-31.
4. D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, ''Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology,'' Review of Economic Studies, 52 (1985), pp. 383-401.
5. Symposium on Patent Policy, Rand Journal of Economics, 21 (Spring 1990).
B. Standardization
1. J. Farrell and G. Saloner, "Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 16 (1985), pp. 70-83.
2. M. Katz and C. Shapiro, ''Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities," Journal of Political Economy, 94 (1986), pp. 822-841.
C. Diffusion of Technologies
1. Rogers and Shoemaker, The Diffusion of Innovation: A Cross-Cultural Approach, Free Press, 1971.
2. G. Ellison and D. Fudenberg, "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," Journal of Political Economy, 101 (1993), pp. 612-643.
D. Empirical Studies
1. A. Pakes, "Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European Patent Stocks, Econometrica, 54 (July 1986), 755-784.
2. M. Trajtenberg, "The Welfare Analysis of Product Innovations with an Application to Computed Tomography Scanners," Journal of Political Economy, 97 (April 1989), 444-479.
3. G. Saloner and A. Shepard, "Adoption of Technologies with Network Effects: An Empirical Examination of the Adoption of Automated Teller Machines," Rand Journal of Economics, 13 (Autumn 1995), 479-501.
4. T. Hubbard, "Why Are Process Monitoring Technologies Valuable? The Use of On-Board Information Technology in the Trucking Industry," mimeo.
5. E. Mansfield, "How Rapidly Does New industrial Technology Leak Out?" Journal of Industrial Economics, 34 (December 1985), 217-223.
6. N. L. Rose and P. L. Joskow, ''The Diffusion of New Technologies. Evidence from the Electric Utility industry," Rand Journal of Economics, 21 (Autumn 1990), 354-373.
XIII . Managerial incentives and Firm Behavior
1. Tirole, pages 34-55.
2. B. Holmstrom, "Managerial Incentive Problems - A Dynamic Perspective,'' in Essays in Honor of Lars Wahlbeck, 1982.
3. S. Grossman and O. Hart, "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem and the Theory of the Corporation,'' Bell Journal of Economics, 11 (Spring 1980), 42-64.
4. A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control,'' Journal of Political Economy, 94 (June 1996), 461-488.
5. O. Hart, "The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme,'' Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (Autumn 1983), 366-382.
6. C. Fershtman and K. Judd, "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, 77(December 1987), 927-940.
7. R. Masson, "Executive Motivation, Earnings, and Consequent Equity Performance," Journal of Political Economy, 79 (December 1971), 1278- 1292.
8. P. Healy, "The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions,'' Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7 (April 1985), 85-107.
XIV . Antitrust: Overview
1. Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, 1992, "Executive Summary of the Antitrust Laws." Kaye, Scholer's Antitrust Deskbook, NY, pp. 319.
2. Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, 1992, "Introduction to EC Competition Law,'' Kaye, Scholer's Antitrust Deskbook, NY, pp. 237-242.
XV . Antitrust: Horizontal Mergers
A. Policy Issues
1. Materials on Time-Warner/Turner Merger (mimeo). Available from Graphic Arts as Part A of the 14.272 Readings Packet.
B. Theory and Evidence
1. J. Farrell & C. Shapiro, "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, 80 (March 1990), 107-126.
2. Robert D. Willig, "Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory, and Merger Guidelines," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 1991, pp. 281-332.
3. B.E. Eckbo, "Mergers and Market Concentration Doctrine Evidence from the Capital Market," Journal of Business, 58 (July 1985), 325-349.
4. R. McAfee & M. Williams, "Can Event Studies Detect Anticompetitive Merger?" Economic Letters, (1988), 199-203.
5. R.A. Prager, "The Effects of Horizontal Mergers on Competition: The Case of the Northern Securities Company," Rand Journal of Economics, 23 (Spring 1992), 123-133.
6. G.L. Mullin, J.C. Mullin, and W.P. Mullin, "The Competitive Effects of Mergers: Stock Market Evidence from the U.S. Steel Dissolution Suit," Rand Journal of Economics, 26 (Summer 1995), 314-330.
7. S. Bhagat, A. Shleifer, & R.W. Wishny, "Hostile Takeovers in the 1980s: The Return to Corporate Specialization," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics, 1990. 1-84.
8. M. Pesendorfer, "Horizontal Mergers in the Paper industry,'' NBER Working Paper 6751. October 1988
C. Horizontal Merger Policy
1. US Department of Justice, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (revised April 1992).
2. J. Hausman and G. Leonard, "Economic Analysis of Differentiated Product Mergers Using Real World Data," mimeo, October 25, 1996.
3. David Scheffman and Pablo Spiller, "Econometric Market Delineation,'' Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 17, 165-178 (1996)
4. G.J. Werden and L.M. Froeb, "The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy,'' Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 10 (October 1994), 407-26.
5. S.C. Salop, L.J. White, F. M. Fisher, & R. Schmalensee, "Symposium: Horizontal Mergers and Antitrust," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1 (Fail 1987), 3-54.
6. S. Dalkir & F.R. Warren-Boulton, "Prices, Market Definition, and the Effects of Merger: Staples-Office Depot (1997),'' in J.E. Kwoka, Jr. and L.J. White, eds., The Antitrust Revolution: Economics, Competition, and Policy, 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1999), pp. 143-165.
XVI . Antitrust: Vertical Relations & Vertical Restraints
1. Tirole, Chapter 4 (including supplementary section).
2. J.A. Ordover, G. Saloner, & S.C. Salop, "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure," American Economic Review, 80 (March 1990), 127-142.
3. Benjamin Klein, "Market Power in Aftermarkets," Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 17, 143-164 (1996).
4. Carl Shapiro, "Aftermarkets and Consumer Welfare: Making Sense of Kodak,'' Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 63 at 483 (1995).
5. O. Hart and J. Tirole, "Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 1990, 205-286.
6. P. Rey and J. Stiglitz, " The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers' Competition," Rand Journal of Economics, 26 (Autumn 1995), 431-451.
7. M. B. Lieberman, "Determinants of Vertical Integration: An Empirical Test," Journal of Industrial Economics, 39(September 1991), 451-466.
8. S.J. Ornstein & D.M. Hanssens, "Resale Price Maintenance: Output Increasing or Restructuring? The Case of Distilled Spirits in the United States," Journal of Industrial Economics, 36 (September 1987), 1-18.
9. F. Lafontaine, "Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 23 (Summer 1992) 263-283.
XVII . The Political Economy of Regulation
1. R. G. Noll, ''Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation,'' in R. Schmalensee & R. D. Willig (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 2, Amsterdam North- Holland, 1989, Ch. 22, 1253-1287.
2. Armstrong et al, Chapter 1.
3. G.J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic regulation,'' Bell Journal of Economics, 2 (Spring 1971), 3-21.
4. S. Peltzman, ''The Economic Theory of regulation after a Decade of Deregulation," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 1989, 1-60.
5. R.A. Posner, ''Taxation by Regulation,'' Bell Journal of Economics, 2 (Spring 1971 ), 22-50.
6. R.A. Posner, ''Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, 5 (Autumn 1974), 335-358.
7. J.Q. Wilson, "The Politics of Regulation," in J.Q. Wilson (Ed.), The Politics of Regulation, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.
8. J.P. Kalt & M. A. Zupan, "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics," American Economic Review, 74 (June 1984), 279-300.
9. R. Prager, "Using Stock Price Data to Measure the Effects of Regulation The Interstate Commerce Act and the Railroad industry,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 20 (Summer 1989), 280-290.
10. T. Romer de H. Rosenthal, "Modern Political Economy and the Study of Regulation," in E. E. Bailey (ed.), Public Regulation: Perspectives on Institutions and Policies, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987, 73-116.
11. B.R. Weingast & M.J. Moran, ''Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," Journal of Political Economy, 91 (October 1983), 765-800.
12. M. McCubbins, R. Noll, & B. Weingast, "Administrative Procedures as instruments of Political Control,"Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 3 (1987), 243-277.
XVIII . Government versus Private Ownership
1. J. Wickers & G. Yarrow, "Economic Perspectives on Privatization,'' Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5 (Spring 1991), 111-132.
2. F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R.W. Wishny, " Privatization in the United States," Rand Journal of Economics, (Autumn, 1997), pp. 447-471
3. D.E.M. Sappington & J.E. Stiglitz, "Privatization, Information and incentives,'' Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 6 (1987), 567-582.
4. Laffont & J. Tirole, Chapter 17.
5. Shleifer & R.W. Wishny, ''Politicians and Firms," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109 (November 1994), 995-1026.
6. R. Teeples & D. Glyer, ''Cost of Water Delivery Systems: Specific and Ownership Effects," Review of Economics and Statistics, 69 (August 1987), 399-408.
7. Galal, L. Jones, P. Tandon, and I. Vogelsang, Welfare Consequences of Selling Public Enterprises, Oxford. Oxford University Press, 1994, Chapter 23.
8. Boardman & A. Wining,"Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments," Journal of Law and Economics, 32 (April 1989), 1-33.
9. P. Murrel (ed.), "Symposium on Economic Transition in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(Fall 1991), 3-217.
10. M. Boycko, A. Shleifer, and R.W. Wishny, "Privatizing Russia," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1993, 139-192.
11. P.L. Joskow, R. Schmalensee, and N. Tsukanova, ''Competition Policy in Russia During and After Privatization,'' Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 1994, 301-381.
XIX . Efficient Regulation of Monopolies
A. The Natural Monopoly Problem
1. W.J. Baumol, J.C. Panzar, & R.D. Willig, Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure, San Diego: Harcourt, Brace Javanovich, 1982, Chapter3, 4, and 7.
2. R. Schmalensee, The Control of Natural Monopolies, Lexington. D.C. Heath, 1979, Chapters 1 and 2.
3. W.W. Sharkey, The Theory of Natural Monopoly, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, Ch. 2 and 4.
4. A. E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation, Volume 1, New York: John Wiley, 1970, Chapters 3-7.
B. Optimal Pricing with Full Information
1. R. Braeutigam, "Optimal Policies for Natural Monopolies," in R. Schmalensee & R. D. Willig (eds.), Handbook of industrial Organization, Volume 2, Amsterdam. North- Holland, 1989, Chapter 23, 1290-1345. (useful overview and general reference)
2. S. Brown and D. Sibley, The Theory of Public Utility Pricing, Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, Chapter 3.
3. A.E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation, Volume 1, New York: John Wiley, 1970, Chapter 2.
4. M.A. Crew & P. R. Kleindorfer, The Economics of' Public Utility Regulation, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986, Chapters 3 and 4.
5. R. Park & B. Mitchell, Optimal Peak Load Pricing for Local Telephone Calls, Rand Corporation (R-3404-1-RC), March 1987.
6. W.J. Baumol, J.C. Panzar, & R. D. Willig, Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure, San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Javanovich, 1982, Chapter 8.
7. R.B. Wilson, Nonlinear Pricing, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, Chapters 4 and 5.
8. W.W. Sharkey and D.S. Sibley, ''Optimal Non-Linear Pricing with Regulatory Preference over Customer Types," Bellcore Discussion Paper 75, January 1992.
9. G.R. Faulhaber, "Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises," American Economic Review, 65 (December 1975) 966-977.
10. K. Palmer, " A Test for Cross Subsidies in Local Telephone Rates: Do Business Customers Subsidize Residential Customers," Rand Journal of Economics, 23 (Autumn 1992), 415-431.
11. A.B. Atkinson & J.E. Stiglitz, Lectures on Public Economics, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980, Lectures 12 and 15.
12. R.R. Braeutigam, ''Social Optimal Pricing with Rivalry and Economies of Scale,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 15 (Spring 1984), 127-134.
C. Rate of Return Regulation
1. R. Schmalensee, ''An Expository Note on Depreciation and Profitability under Rate-of Return Regulation,'' Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1 (September 1989), 293-298.
2. W.J. Baumol & A.K. Klevorick, ''Input Choices and Rate-of Return Regulation. An Overview of the Discussion,'' Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 1 (Autumn 1970), 162-190.
3. E.E. Bailey, Economic Theory of Regulatory Constraint, Lexington D.C. Heath, 1973.
D. Institutions and Mechanisms for Asymmetric Information
1. P.L. Joskow & R. Schmalensee, ''Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities,'' Yale Journal on Regulation, 4 (December 1986), 1-49.
2. Laffont & Tirole, Introduction, Chapters 1 & 2, Chapters 3 & 9 are recommended.
3. J.-J. Laffont, "The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After,'' Econometrica, 62 (May 1994), 507-537.
4. A. Shleifer, "A Theory of Yardstick Competition," Rand Journal of Economics, 16 (Autumn 1985), 319-327.
5. Armstrong et al, Chapters 2 & 3 and Section 4.4.
6. D. Baron, "Design of Regulatory institutions and Mechanisms,'' in R. Schmalensee & R.D. Willig (Eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 2, Amsterdam North- Holland, 1989, Chapter 24, 1347-1447.
7. T. Lewis & D. Sappington, ''Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand," American Economic Review, 78 (December 1988), 986-998.
8. R.J. Gilbert and D.M. Newbery, ''The Dynamic Efficiency of Regulatory Constitutions,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 25 (Winter 1994), 538-554.
E. Price Caps and Related Regimes
1. Armstrong et al, Chapter 6.
2. M. Crew and P. Kleindorfer, "Incentive Regulation in the United States Some Lessons," Journal of Regulatory Economics, May 1996, pp. 211-226.
3. R. Schmalensee, ''Good Regulatory Regimes," Rand Journal of Economics, 20 (Autumn 1989), 417-436.
4. Armstrong et al, Chapter 9.
F. Auction-Based Approaches
1. H. Demsetz, ''Why Regulate Utilities'' Journal of Law and Economics, 11 (April 1968), 55-66.
2. Laffont & Tirole, Chapters 7 and 8.
3. P.C. Cramton, ''Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 4 (Summer 1995), 267-343.
4. B. Chakravorti, W.W. Sharkey, Y. Spiegel, and S. Wilkie, ''Auctioning the Airwaves: The Contest for Broadband PCS Spectrum," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 4 (Summer 1995), 345~373.
XX . The Effects of Economic Regulation and Deregulation
A. Overview
1. P. L. Joskow & N.L. Rose, ''Economic Regulation and its Effects," in R. Schmalensee & R.D. Willig (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 2, Amsterdam: North- Holland, 1989, Ch. 25, 1450-1506.
2. P. L. Joskow & R.G. Noll, ''Economic Regulation during the 1980s," in M. Feldstein (Ed.), Economic Policy During the 1980s, University of Chicago Press, 1994. (Useful general survey and reference)
B. Access Pricing
1. Laffont & Tirole, Chapters 5 and 6.
2. J.-J. Laffont and J. Tirole, ''Creating Competition Through interconnection: Theory and Practice," Journal of Regulatory Economics. November 1996, pp. 227-256.
3. J.-J. Laffont and J. Tirole, "Notes on Access Pricing and Competition in Telecommunications" (mimeo).
4. J.-J. Laffont, P. Rey, and J. Tirole, "Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing,'' Rand Journal of Economics 29 (Spring 1998) 1-37.
5. J.-J. Laffont, P. Rey, and J. Tirole, "Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination,'' Rand Journal of Economics 29 (Spring 1998) 38-56.
C. Telecommunications
1. Armstrong et al., Ch. 7.
2. D. Kridel, D. Sappington and D. Weisman, "The Effects of incentive Regulation in the Telecommunications Industries: A Survey, ''Journal of Regulatory Economics, May 1996, pp. 269-306.
3. S.G. Donald & D.E.M. Sappington, ''Explaining the Choice Among Regulatory Plans in the U.S. Telecommunications industry,'' Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 4 (Summer 1995), 237-265.
4. A.D. Mathios & R. P. Rogers, ''The Impact of Alternative Forms of State Regulation of AT &T Direct-Dial, Long-Distance Telephone Rates," RAND Journal of Economics, 20 (Autumn 1989), 437-453.
5. S. Greenstein, S. McMaster, & P. Spiller,"The Effect of incentive Regulation on Infrastructure Modernization: Local Exchange Companies' Deployment of Digital Technology," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 4 (Summer 1995), 187-236.
6. J. Hausman, "Taxation By Telecommunications Regulation,'' September 30, 1997 (mimeo)
7. W. E. Taylor & L. Taylor, ''Postdivestiture Long-Distance Competition in the U.S., " American Economic Review, 83 (May 1993), 185-190.
8. P.W. MacAvcy, "Tacit Collusion Under Regulation in the Pricing of interstate Long- Distance Telephone Services," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 4 (Summer 1995), 147-185.
9. S. Kahal, D. Kaserman and J. Mayo, ''Is the `Dominant Firm` Dominant? An Empirical Analysis of AT & T's Market Power," Journal of Law and Economics, October 1996, pp. 497-517.
D. Electricity
1. G. Stigler & C. Friedland, "What Can Regulators Regulate?" Journal of Law and Economics 5 (October 1962) 1-16.
2. S. Peltzman, ''George Stigler's Contribution to the Analysis of Economic Regulation." Journal of Political Economy, October 1993, pp. 819-832.
3. G.A. Jarrell, ''The Demand for State Regulation of the Electric Utility industry,'' Journal of Law and Economics, 21 (October 1978), 269-295.
4. P. L. Joskow, "Inflation and Environmental Concern. Structural Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, 17 (October 1974), 29 1-327.
5. W. Hendricks, "The Effects of Regulation on Collective Bargaining in Electric Utilities,'' Bell Journal of Economics, 6 (Autumn 1975), 451-465.
6. R. Green and D. Newbery, ''Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market," Journal of Political Economy, 1992 (100), PP 929-953.
7. C. D. Wolfram, "Measuring Duopoly Power in the British Electricity Spot Market,'' American Economic Review (forthcoming).
8. C. D. Wolfram, "Strategic Bidding in a Multiunit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity in England and Wales,'' Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 29, NO. 4, 703-725, Winter 1998.
9. David Newbery, "Competition, Contracts and Entry in the Electricity Spot Market,'' Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 29, No. 4, 726-749, Winter 1998.
10. F.A. Wolak, "An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Hedge Contracts on Bidding Behavior in a Competitive Electricity Market, mimeo, October 1998.
11. Paul Joskow and Jean Tirole, "Transmission Rights and Market Power: Part I - Financial Rights, Part 11 - Physical Rights,'' mimeo, December 1998.
12. F.A. Wolak & R.H. Patrick, ''The Impact of Market Rules and Market Structure on the Price Determination Process in the England and Wales Electricity Market," mimeo, Stanford University, June 1996.
13. D. Newbery and M.G. Pollit, "The Restructuring and Privatization of British CEGB -- Was it Worth It?'' Journal of Industrial Economics, September 1997, pp. 269-303.
14. P.L. Joskow, ''Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electricity Sector," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer 1997, pp. 119-138.
15. S. Borenstein, J. Bushnell, and C.R. Knittel, "Market Power in Electricity Markets: Beyond Concentration Measures,'' University of California Energy Institute, PWP-059, July 1998.
16. W.W. Hogan,"Contract Networks for Electric Power Transmission,'' Journal of Regulatory Economics, 4 ( 1992), 2 1 1-242.
17. P. L. Joskow, N.L. Rose, and C.D. Wolfram, ''Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry,'' Rand Journal of Economics (Spring 1996).
E. Cable Television
1. A.B. Jaffe & D.M. Kantner, ''Market Power of Local Cable Television Franchises: Evidence from the Effects of Deregulation," Rand Journal of Economics, 21 (Summer 1990), 226-234.
2. R.A. Prager, "Firm Behavior in Franchise Monopoly Markets," Rand Journal of Economics, 12 (Summer 1990), 211-225.
3. J.W. Mayo & Y. Osuka, "Market Power of Local Cable Television Franchises. Evidence from the Effects of Deregulation," RAND Journal of Economics, 22 (Autumn 1991), 396-410.
4. R.N. Rabinovitz, ''Market Power and Price increases for Basic Cable Service Since Deregulation, Rand Journal of Economics, 24 (Spring 1993), 1-18.
F. Transportation
1. T.W. Gilligan, W.J. Marshall & B. R. Weingast, ''The Economic incidence of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Short- Haul Pricing Constraint,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 21 (Summer 1990), 189-210.
2. N.L. Rose, ''Labor Rent Sharing and Regulation: Evidence from the Trucking Industry,'' Journal o Political Economy, 95 (December 1987), 1 146-1178.
3. N. L. Rose, "The Incidence of Regulatory Rents in the Motor Carrier Industry," Rand Journal of Economics, 16 (Autumn 1985), 299-318.
4. J.S. Heywood & J.H. Peoples, "Deregulation and the Prevalence of Black Truck Drivers," Journal of Law & Economics, 37 (April 1994), 133-156.
5. D. Card, "Deregulation and Labor Earnings in the Airline industry,'' MBER Working Paper 5687, Cambridge, MA, July 1996.
6. D. M. Kennet, "Did Deregulation Affect Aircraft Engine Maintenance? An Empirical Policy Analysis,'' RAND Journal of Economics, 24 (Winter 1993), 542-558.
7. S. Borenstein, "The Evolution of U.S. Airline Competition," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6 (Spring 1992) 45-74.
G. Banking Regulation
1. A. Marcus, ''Deregulation and Bank Financial Policy," Journal of Banking and Finance, 8 (December 1984), 557-565.
2. R.S. Grossman, "'Deposit insurance, Regulation, and Moral Hazard in the Thrift Industry: Evidence from the 1930s," American Economic Review, 82 (September 1992), 800-821.
3. R. S. Kroszner & R.G. Rajan, ''Is the Glass-Steagall Act Justified? A Study of the U.S. Experience with Universal Banking before 1933," American Economic Review, 84 (September 1994), 810-832.
4. R.G. Hubbard and D. Palia, "Executive Pay and Performance: Evidence from the U.S. Banking Industry,'' Journal of Financial Economics, 39 (1995), 105-130.
5. R. S. Kroszner and P. E. Strahan, "The Political Economy of Deregulation Evidence from the Relaxation of Banking Branching Restrictions in the United States," University of Chicago Center for Research in Security Prices Working Paper 460, November 1997.
XXI . "Social" Regulation: Externalities, Risks, and Asymmetric Information
A. Overview
1. H. K. Gruenspecht & L. B. Lave, "The Economics of Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation," in R Schmalensee & R. D. Willig (Eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 2, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1989, Chapter 26, 1507-1550. (useful overview and general reference; will not be discussed explicitly).
2. W. K. Wiscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, Chapter 14, 248-301.
3. W.K. Viscusi, ''The Value of Risks to Life and Health," Journal of Economic Literature, 31 (December 1993), 1912-1946.
B. Environmental Protection
1. M. Weitzman, ''Prices vs. Quantities,'' Review of Economic Studies, 41 (1974), 477-491. (if you haven't seen this in micro sequence).
2. E. Kwerel, "To Tell the Truth: Imperfect information and Optimal Pollution Control," Review of Economic Studies, 44 (1977), 595-601.
3. M .L. Cropper & W. E. Oates, "Environmental Economics: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, 30 (June 1992), 675-740.
4. W. Oates, P. Portney, & A. McGartland, "The Net Benefits of Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation," American Economic Review, 79 (December 1989), 1233-1242.
5. T. H. Tietenberg, Emissions Trading: An Exercise in Reforming Pollution Policy, Washington: Resources for the Future, 1985.
6. P. L. Joskow, R. Schmalensee, and E. M. Bailey, "The Market for Sulfur Dioxide Emissions," American Economic Review, 88 (September 1998) 669-685.
7. P. L. Joskow & R. Schmalensee, "The Political Economy of Market-Based Environmental Policy: The 1990 U.S. Acid Rain Program," Journal of Law and Economics, April 1998.
8. R. Schmalensee, P. L. Joskow, A. D. Ellerman, J. P. Montero, and E. M. Bailey, "An Interim Evaluation of Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Trading," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(Summer 1998) 53-68.
9. R.N. Stavins, "What Can We Learn From the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading,'' Journal of Economic Perspectives 12 (Summer 1998) 69-88.
10. H. Sigman, "Midnight Dumping. Public Policies and Illegal Disposal of Used Oil," Rand Journal of Economics 29 (Spring 1998) 157-178.
11. R. Becker and V. Henderson, "Effects of Air Quality Regulation on Decisions of Firms in Polluting Industries," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 6160, September 1997.
12. R. Schmalensee et al, "Symposium on Global Climate Change," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7 (Fall 1993), 3-86.
13. B.P. Pashigian, "Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests are Being Protected?'' Economic Inquiry, 23 (October 1985), 551-584.
C. Health and Safety Regulation
1. W. K. Wiscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, Chapter 13. Chapter 12 is recommended.
2. S. Borenstein and M. Zimmerman, "Market incentive for Safe Commercial Airline Operation,'' American Economic Review 78 (December 1988) 919-935.
3. D. Dranove & D. Meltzer, ''Do Important Drugs Reach the Market Sooner?'' Rand Journal of Economics, 25 (Autumn 1994), 402-423.
4. L.G. Thomas, ''Revealed Bureaucratic Preference: Priorities of the Consumer Product Safety Commission," Rand Journal of Economics, 19(Spring 1988), 102-113.
