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【3月1日】北京：Equilibrium Principal-Agent Contrac

题目：Equilibrium Principal-Agent Contracts: Competition and R&D Incentives
报告人：Federico Etro, University of Milan
时间：2:00-3:30pm, March 1
地点：光华新楼217教室

Abstract:
We analyze competition between firms engaged in R&D activities in the choice of incentive contracts for managers with hidden productivities. The equilibrium screening contracts require extra effort/investment from the most productive managers compared to the first best contracts: under additional assumptions on the hazard rate of the distribution of types we obtain no-distortion in the middle rather than at the top. Moreover, the equilibrium contracts are characterized by effort differentials between (any) two types that are always increasing with the number of firms, suggesting a positive relation between competition and high-powered incentives. An inverted-U curve between competition and absolute investments can emerge for the most productive managers, especially when entry is endogenous. These results persist when contracts are not observable, when they include quantity precommitments, and when products are imperfect substitutes.
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