报告：Business Connections and Informed Trading of Mutual Fund Managers
报告人：YUE TANG (Emory University)
时间：2010年3月1日（周一）9:00-10:20am
地点：光华新楼217教室
摘要：
This paper explores the hypothesis that investors gain information advantages through business connections made during prior employment. Using hand-collected data, this study finds mutual fund managers who previously worked as sell-side analysts put significantly more weight on the stocks they previously covered, and those stocks perform significantly better than the other stocks in their portfolio.
Holdings of stocks that the fund managers covered previously outperform their other holdings by 18 percent annually. The abnormal returns are concentrated around earnings announcements and fund managers’ trades of covered stocks predict subsequent earnings surprises. However, the superior performance of covered stocks decreases significantly after the implementation of Regulation-FD, which prohibits selective disclosure by company management. Also, after executive changes at the covered companies, fund managers place less weight on covered stocks, and they no longer earn abnormal returns on them. The results indicate that fund managers may have access to inside information through the business connections they made while working as analysts.
