续性。要想长久保持法治，国家就必须转变为永续国家，即国家各项制度的存续期限必须要超越这些制度的创立者的生命，这样一来，政府官员的人格特征就不再那么重要了。要具备这种能力，需要适当形式的可信承诺，它们激励政府官员尊重这些制度及其所保护的权利，这样政府的更迭就不会导致制度和权利的重大改变。
这一分析视角阐明了为什么把法治移植到发展中国家如此困难，以及为什么发展中国家常常积极抵制那些创建法治的努力。
自然国家通过将特权或租金赋予强势成员，来解决暴力问题。这些国家会随着环境的变化调整特权的分配。环境的重大变化，比如危机之后，往往也要求对特权、制度和政策进行重大调整。这些调整常常伴随着暴力或暴力威胁。政府垮台、政变发生、权利被更改、资产被没收、宪法被篡改或被忽视，政策也被转向。自然国家还缺乏一个永续国家。永续性的缺乏意味着这些国家不具有必需的可信承诺来激励政治人物尊重宪法规则，从而在这些国家维持大多数权利和制度变得困难重重。
即便自然国家采用了正确的民主宪政条款，如权力分立、对个人权利的明确表述，如果不能建立一个永续国家，它们也无法长期维持这些条款。绝大多数改革的问题在于，它们试图直接把开放进入秩序的规则、权利和制度移植到自然国家。由于未能改变自然国家的基本结构和激励，这些努力几乎总是以失败告终。一旦自然国家面临危机，它们就会不可避免地发生剧烈的变动，导致对制度、规则和政策的重大修订，法治也就很难维系。
要实现法治，自然国家必须从有限进入秩序向开放进入秩序转轨12。这意味着脆弱型自然国家必须首先变成初级自然国家，初级自然国家必须转变为成熟型自然国家，而成熟型自然国家在具备了启动条件后开始转轨。只有在这一发展阶段，自然国家才能开始创建有利于法治的制度和组织基础。
因此，本文的主旨也许有些悲观。它认为创立法治涉及从有限进入秩序向开放进入秩序的转轨，这个过程将异常艰难。历史上，自然国家一直占据优势，直到今天，它也是所有国家类型中数量最多的一种。自然国家已经存在了一万年之久，如今，只有二十多个国家成功地完成了这一转轨，而且，它们大多集中在欧洲。（上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院 黄少卿 译）
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* Barry R. Weingast，斯坦福大学政治学系Ward C. Krebs家族教席教授，胡佛研究所高级研究员。作者感谢Lee Cabatingan、Margaret Levi、Robert Nelson、Douglass North、Jed Stiglitz、John Wallis和Steven Webb的有益评议与交流。本文收录在Nelson（2009）编著的Global Perspectives on the Rule of Law中。——编者注
来源：《比较》 2010年第2期
